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JURISDICTION
The specific statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on
the Utah Court of Appeals is found at § 78-2-(a) -3 (2) (N) of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No, 1;

The Order on Order to Show Cause is

unsupported by the facts and evidence before the Court.

The

standard is correction of error Carlton vs. Carlton. 84 UAR 21
(Utah App. 1988) .
Issue No. 2:

The findings in the Order are inadequate to

support the Order and are not supported by the facts before the
Court. The standard of review is "an abuse of discretion" Carlton
vs. Carlton, 84 UAR 21 (Utah App. 1988).
Issue No. 3;

Can the Court reject a stipulation for failure

to comply with State Child Support Guidelines in 1989, and then in
1992 adopt the same stipulation without any additional evidence.
The standard is correction of error.
Issue No. 4:

Carlton, supra.

Is the Court bound by stipulations of the

parties when the Court has rejected the stipulation and dismissed
the case in which the stipulation was submitted?
Clawson, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983).

1

Clawson vs.

Moonev vs. G.R. & Associates.

746

P.2d

1174

(Utah App.

1987).

The

standard

is abuse of

discretion.
Issue No. 5: Can one party to an alleged stipulation seek to
defeat the duty of the Trial Court? Pearson vs. Pearson, 561 P.2d
1080 (Utah 1977); the standard is "abuse of discretion."
Issue No. 6; Is a stipulation which is submitted to the Court
and rejected by the Court, through the inaction of the parties, and
in which one of the parties seeks to change the terms of the
stipulation at the time it is submitted, a binding stipulation
representing an agreement between the parties?
abuse of discretion.
Issue No. 7:

This standard is

Kline vs. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975).

May the Court modify a binding decree from the

State of Texas without finding that there has been a material
change of circumstances?

The standard is the Order must be

supported by findings of fact.

Gale vs. Gale, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah

1953).
Issue No. 8: Has there been a meeting of the minds and mutual
assent where Appellee filed a letter with the Court seeking to
change the terms of the stipulation at the time of the submittal
of the stipulation?

The standard is correction of error.

John

Call Engineering Inc., vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah
1987); Vassels vs. Lo Guidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987).

2

Issue No. 9: May the Court enforce a stipulation made 2 1/2
years previously, and not agreed to between the parties?
standard is correction of error.

The

Guardian State Bank vs. Stancrl,

778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988).
Issue No* 10: May the Court enforce a stipulation rejected
2 1/2 year previously, where the party seeking enforcement has
breached the stipulation?

The standard is correction of error.

Issue No, 11: May the Court enforce a stipulation which it
had rejected 2 1/2 years earlier and which due to an unforseen
event, is rendered impossible or totally impractical?

Standard is

correction of error. Western Properties vs. Southern Utah Aviation,
Inc.. 776 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The decision of this case depends upon the interpretation of
§§ 78-45-7; 78-45-7.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and
Rules 4-403 and 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The parties obtained a Decree of Divorce in Texas on or about
the 19th of September, 1986 (R. Pgs. 1-18: Addendum #1), which
inter

alia,

required Defendant to pay $700.00 per month child

support (R Pg. 15: Addendum #1, Pg. 4). The Defendant then moved
to Virginia and the Plaintiff removed to Utah, then to Colorado.
3

While in Utah, Plaintiff brought Action #88-4400078 in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, to enforce child support payments from
Defendant (R Pgs. 19-22: Addendum #2).

In the said action, the

parties were represented by their respective counsel.

To settle

the said case, the parties entered into a stipulation (R Pgs. 104108: Addendum #3).

This Stipulation (together with an Order, R

Pgs. 12 3-127) was submitted to the Court, Commissioner Howard H.
Maetani presiding, on the 20th of November, 1989

(R Pg. 166,

Paragraph 17, Addendum #11, Pg. 5, Paragraph 17). The Commissioner
requested additional fiscal information from the parties prior to
approving the Stipulation and signing the Order, based upon his
interpretation of the child support agreed to between the parties
being in compliance with the then existing Child Support Guidelines
of the State (R Pg. 165, Paragraph 19; R Pg. 166, Paragraph 18:
Addendum #11, Pg. 5 Paragraph 18) .
requested

information

Neither party provided the

(R Pg. 165, Paragraph

19; R Pg. 193,

Paragraph 7: Addendum #11, Pg. 6, Paragraph 20).

The Commissioner

rejected the Stipulation and refused to sign the Order on January
8, 1990, and mailed both the Stipulation and the Order back to
Defendant's attorney, Graham Dodd (R 165 Paragraph 20; R Pg. 87:
Addendum #6).

On March 18, 1991, the Court issued its own Order

to Show Cause (R, Pg. 88) why the case should not be dismissed and
when neither Plaintiff nor Defendant appeared, the Commissioner
4

formally dismissed the case without prejudice on April 15, 1991 for
failure to prosecute (R Pg. 96: Addendum #7). By February 5, 1992,
both of the parties had moved back to Utah and the Defendant, being
unemployed, petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No.
92-4400164, pro se, inter

alia

for a modification of the Texas

Divorce Decree, with respect to child support payments based upon
his material change of circumstances, i.e., he had no income. This
case was consolidated with the Plaintiff's action (R Pg. 199:
Addendum #8) .

For her part, Plaintiff brought an Order to Show

Cause why Defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to
pay child support and to increase the child support in Case No. CV
88-4400078.

The parties appeared before Commissioner Maetani on

the Order to Show Cause on the 17th of March, 1992 (R Pg. 100:
Addendum #9) .

Defendant appeared pro-se and Plaintiff with her

counsel. At the said hearing, Plaintiff urged that the Court adopt
the old Stipulation formerly rejected by the Court and enter an
Order incorporating the Stipulation

despite the fact that the

Defendant reminded the Court that the Stipulation had been rejected
by the Court for improper documentation two and one-half years
previously, and the same Commissioner had dismissed the case for
failure on the part of the parties to prosecute (See transcript of
hearing R Pgs. 489-504: Addendum #10).
that

because

Defendant's

attorney
5

But the Commissioner ruled
had

failed

to

file

the

Stipulation, he could not penalize Plaintiff and would enforce the
Stipulation nunc-pro-tunc

(R Pg. 491) . But the Commissioner gave

Defendant 10 days to provide documentation and any other reason why
it should not be adopted. On March 25, 1992, Defendant filed his
documents with the Court which comprised an Affidavit of Graham
Dodd with supporting documents (R Pgs. 121-170: Addendum #11), an
Affidavit of Norman Rowe with supporting documents (R Pgs. 171195 Addendum #12) and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R Pgs
113-120).

Notwithstanding the filing of these documents, the

Commissioner's signature was stamped on the Order on Order to Show
Cause on March 30, 1992.
In his Order on Order to Show Cause, Commissioner Maetani
consolidated the case that he had previously dismissed (#884400078) and in which he had rejected the Stipulation based upon
the parties1

failure to respond

to the Court's request for

additional information (R Pg. 198, Paragraph 1: Addendum #13), with
Case #92-4400164.

Further the Order states that the Commissioner

ruled the way he did because the Stipulation entered into by and
between the parties on September 10, 1989, was prepared by Norman
Rowe• s attorney but was never filed with the Court (R. Pg. 298,
Paragraph 2: Addendum #13).

The documents submitted to the Court

on March 25, 1991 clearly show that the Stipulation was filed with
the Court by Norman Rowe's attorney, but were rejected and mailed
6

back (R Pg. 87, Letter of Court Clerk: Addendum #5).

There was no

good cause shown as to why the dismissal of the case based on the
parties' joint refusal to supply the information requested by the
Court and Plaintiff's failure to prosecute should be set aside, and
why the case should be reopened and the Stipulation enforced,
especially in light of the Defendant's objection to it.
transcript of hearing R Pgs. 489-504: Addendum #10.)

(See

In addition,

no explanation of why if the Stipulation did not comply with the
law on September 10, 1989, it could suddenly comply on March 17,
1992.

The Defendant objected to the Order on Order to Show Cause

(R Pgs. 210-306).

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen overruled the

objection on the 4th of June, 1992, without making any findings (R
Pg. 398: Addendum #14). Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on
July 6, 1992 (R Pgs. 449-450: Addendum #15) in which he appealed
the

Order

Christensen

of

Commissioner

Maetani

and

the

ruling

of Judge

as they pertain to Case No. 88-4400078.

Since

Defendant was proceeding pro se on Case #92-44000164 to obtain
modification of the child support payments as found in the Texas
decree, Defendant moved for a motion to extend time on the appeal
until Case No. 924400164 could be resolved at the Trial Court
level.

This motion was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on

October 13, 1992.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A stipulation of the parties is never binding upon a Trial
Court and neither party to the stipulation can direct the authority
of the Court nor seek to have the Trial Court avoid its duty of
modifying a divorce decree due to changed circumstances.

In

addition, the parties effectively waived the Stipulation by not
providing the Trial Court with satisfactory fiscal information to
comply with the Child Support Guidelines of the State.

In

addition, the parties, although both signed the Stipulation, never
had a meeting of the minds as to its contents and each signed
believing the document stated something different; constituting a
mutual mistake. The Trial Court rejected the Stipulation and Order
and dismissed the suit under which it was filed. The Court may not
now reinstate the Stipulation of the parties without the consent
of the parties without showing good cause, and the Trial Court's
order must reflect the facts before it. The enquiry of the Court
should not have been the enforcement of the Stipulation; but the
change in material circumstances of the parties.

The Trial Court

is obligated to follow statutory requirements and follow the Code
of Judicial Administration.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Stipulation of the Parties Not Binding on the Court,

The Stipulation heretofore submitted by the parties is not binding
8

upon the Court, and the Trial Court has complete discretion to set
it aside if it so chooses. See Kline vs. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah
1975); and as the Utah Supreme Court said in Clawson vs. Clawson,
675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983), "Stipulations of the parties to an action
are only advisory to the Court and the Court is not bound by them."
In addition, the Supreme Court has said:
If there is any justification in law or equity for
avoiding or repudiating a stipulation and he timely does
so, he is entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not.
Kline, at Page 476.
Further, in a 1987 Utah Court of Appeals case, while acknowledging
under certain conditions that courts can be bound by stipulations
between the parties, the Court indicated "that they are not bound
when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved."
Mooney vs. G.R. and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174.

(Ut. Ct. of App.

1987)
In the instant case, the Stipulation was submitted to the
Court, together with a proposed Order (R Pg. 166, Paragraph 17:
Addendum #11, Paragraph 17).

However, the Court feeling that the

Stipulation did not meet the requirements of the Child Support
Guidelines Statutes of the State, requested further documentation
from both parties (R Pg. 116, Paragraph 18: Addendum #11, Paragraph
18) .

9

II. Statutory Requirement. The applicable statutes and their
pertinent language are as follows:
§ 78-45-7.3(3)(a).
In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving
parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsection
78-45-7.5(5); and
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent with
the guidelines.
The record in this case is devoid of any child support
worksheets, financial verification or written statements indicating
that the child support in the Stipulation was consistent with the
Guidelines. Clearly, in signing the Order the Trial Court violated
this statute.

Further, the Court failed to follow Rule 4-504 of

the Code of Judicial Administration.

In subparagraph (8) of that

Rule it states:
No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the
stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the
clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
A careful review of the record indicates that the Stipulation
was neither signed by respective counsel, nor read into the record.
Thus, by adopting it, the Court violated this rule, and renders its
Order unenforceable.
10

In 1989, when the documentation was not forthcoming, the Court
quite correctly rejected both the Stipulation and the proposed
Order, and both documents were returned by the Court through its
Clerk to the Defendant's attorney, who had mailed them to the Court
(R Pg. 165, Paragraph 20; R Pg. 87: Addendum #5).
Further, based upon the failure of either party to provide
the necessary documentation, the Court on its own motion, dismissed
the case on April 15, 1991 (R Pg. 96: Addendum #7).

But Defendant

submits that once having following the statute in 1989, it could
not arbitrarily violate it in 1992 without additional facts to
bring the Stipulation within the purview of the statute.
In the second hearing, on the same case on March 17, 1992,
that hearing was clearly governed by § 78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, which states in its applicable parts:
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior court order unless there has been a
material change of circumstances on the part of the
obligor or obligee.
What the Court had before it was a joint request for modification
of the Texas Decree based upon changed circumstances.

Instead of

investigating the parties alleged changes in their circumstances,
as required by statute, the Court committed error by adopting a
stipulation which did not meet the requirements of § 78-457.3(3) (a) when it was submitted in 1989, and still did not when it
was resubmitted in 1992.

There is no evidence in the record to
11

show compliance with either § 78-45-7.3(3)(a) or § 78-45-7 and
therefore Defendant submits because the parties were given the
opportunity to render the Stipulation enforceable by providing the
necessary documentation to bring it into compliance with statute,
but failed to do so on two separate occasions, that it cannot and
should not be enforced.
III.

Findings of the Order Not Supported by Facts:
(a) In Paragraph 2 of the Order, it states that the

parties entered into a Stipulation on September 10, 1989,
prepared by Norman Rowe's attorney, and that the Stipulation
was never filed by his attorney. This statement in the Order
is manifestly incorrect since the documents and Affidavits
filed with the Court on March 25, 1992, clearly indicate that
the Stipulation was filed with the Court, and was rejected.
(See Affidavit of Graham Dodd and accompanying documents from
the Clerk of the Court returning the Stipulation and Order,
Addendum #fs 5 and 11) . That the Court committed error, there
can be no doubt; for in the transcript of the hearing held on
March

17, 1991, the Commissioner concluded

in ten

different places that the Stipulation was never filed.

(10)
(R

Pgs. 492, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 501, and 502: Addendum #10)
This could have been avoided had he read the file before him
and his own clerk»s letter (R Pg. 87: Addendum #5).
12

(b) The

above Affidavit

and

accompanying

documents,

together with the Affidavit of Norman Rowe (R Pg. 193-195:
Addendum #12), clearly indicate that the Court rejected the
Stipulation based on the parties' joint failure to supply
additional information to the Court (R Pgs. 113-195), thus
rendering the Stipulation not in compliance with the Child
Support Guidelines of the State, as enumerated above, which
required fiscal disclosure by the parties.

The record does

not show any additional disclosure to the Court on or before
March 17, which would render the Stipulation in compliance
with the Guidelines.

If it was rejected by the Trial Court

in 1989 due to failure to comply with statute, then it should
also have been rejected in 1992.
(c) Further, Paragraph 2 states that the parties in
reliance

on

the

Stipulation,

executed

a

Satisfaction

of

Judgment and Mr. Rowe paid to Mrs. Rowe the sum of $12,600.00.
The Affidavits before the Court, indicate that the $12,600.00
was

paid

$11,000.00

to
to

satisfy
satisfy

back
an

child

support

administrative

($1,600.00)
default

and

judgment

obtained by the State of Utah for and in behalf of Mrs. Rowe.
Mrs. Rowe accepted the offer of the money and in exchange
thereof

executed

the Satisfaction.

13

Therefore, Mrs. Rowe

received full consideration for executing the Satisfaction of
Judgment.
(d) The Affidavits before the Court indicate that
Mrs. Rowe, at the last minute in a written letter to the
Court, attempted to change the terms and conditions of
the Stipulation (R Pg. 103).

This, together with the

failure of the parties to supply the information to the
Court

as

requested

by

the

Court,

indicates

their

unwillingness to abide by the Stipulation at the time
when it was submitted by Graham Dodd, Mr. Norman Rowe's
attorney.

In addition, Mr. Rowe's letter of September

10, 1990 (R Pg. 191: Addendum #12) together with his
Affidavit (R Pg. 194, Paragraph 6: Addendum #12) clearly
indicates his belief that since the Court had rejected
the Stipulation, it was null and void.

Thereby clearly

voiding the Court's finding in its Order that the parties
relied on the Stipulation.

(See Paragraph 2 of Order on

Order to Show Cause (R Pgs. 297-298: Addendum #13.)
IV. Plaintiff Cannot Direct the Authority of the Court. The
Plaintiff is now attempting to enforce a stipulation which was
submitted to the Court, refused by the Court, and the case
dismissed, based upon failure to comply with statutes and failure
to prosecute.

Our Supreme Court has held that the parties to an
14

action may not seek to defeat the authority or duty of the Trial
Court through a stipulation.
1977).

Pearson vs, Pearson, 561 P.2d (Utah

Defendant submits that this Court is not bound by the

alleged Stipulation filed with the parties1 signatures on it, and
this has been the law in the State of Utah for many years.

See

Johnson vs. Johnson, 439 P.2d 843, 21 Utah 2d 23 (1968), where the
Supreme Court held:
Trial Court does not have to pay any attention
to written stipulation of the parties inter se
when making division of property in divorce
actions.
Since the Court is not bound by the Stipulation, and once
having correctly rejected it, must disclose some compelling reason
to adopt it and to cure its statutory defects, which it has failed
to do, must follow that its Order is void.

The facts, the

statutes, the rules and the law are manifestly contrary to the
action taken by the Trial Court.
V.

Parties Effectively Waive Stipulation Through Non-Action

and Plaintiff is Now Estopped From Asserting It. The parties were
advised that the Court had rejected the Stipulation and the Order,
subject to the parties providing additional information to the
Court (R Pg. 165, Paragraph 19: Addendum #11; R Pg.193, Paragraph
7: Addendum #12, see letter of Defendant to Plaintiff (R Pg. 191:
Addendum #12).

Neither party acted upon the request of the Court

and it was not until the Defendant became unemployed and ceased to
15

make child support payments that the Plaintiff brought her Order
to Show Cause, invoking the non-complying Stipulation on a case
which had effectively been dismissed 2 1/2 years previously for
sound statutory reasons.

The inaction of the Plaintiff between

1989 when the Stipulation was rejected and February of 1992 when
she tried to enforce it, is just too long a period of time to
remain inactive. Defendant has submitted a record of child support
payments through December of 1991 (R Pgs. 189-173: Addendum #12).
If calculated correctly, those show payments of almost $700.00 per
month, in compliance with the Texas Decree and Plaintiff's apparent
acceptance of the lesser amount. Defendant reminded Plaintiff that
he was only paying the amount ordered by the Texas Decree and that
the Stipulation had been rejected (R Pgs. 190-191: Addendum #12).
Therefore, it was an error of the Court to enforce the Stipulation
nunc-pro-tunc

and fail to consider the current circumstances of the

parties and past payments.

Defendants submits that even if the

Stipulation had been enforceable in 1989, the child support was
still subject to review due to material change of circumstances per
§ 78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The parties had
effectively waived their rights to enforce the Stipulation by
inaction.

The Supreme Count has said that, "A waiver is the

intentional relinquishment of a known right.11

Plateau Mining Co.

vs. Utah Division of Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 770 (Utah 1990).
16

Plaintiff had a known right to enforce the Stipulation in 1989,
when it was before the Court, but when she refused to act, after
notice, she waived that right. The Supreme Court in Beckstead vs.
Deseret Roofing Company, Inc.. 831 P.2d 130 (Utah 1992) said:
Failure to adhere to precise terms of the contract,
combined with the absence of notice of a party's
intention to insist on strict compliance, is enough
evidence to support a finding of waiver (at Page 133).
By not insisting on the adoption of the Stipulation, by not
providing

the

documentation

requested

by

the

Court, and by

accepting the $700.00 per month as per the Texas Decree, and by
doing nothing after notice, the Plaintiff waived enforcement of the
Stipulation.

Even at the second hearing, the Plaintiff failed to

bring the Stipulation within the statutes and Rule as above cited.
Plaintiff is now estopped from enforcing the Stipulation,
according to CECO vs. Concrete Specialists, Inc.. 772 P.2d 967
(Utah 1989).

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court said, estoppel

requires proof of three elements: (1) . . . failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable
action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on basis
of first party's failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second
party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict
or repudiate such . . .

failure to act (at Page 969) .

By not

acting to enforce the Stipulation and by accepting the lesser child
support payments as per the Texas Decree and by not responding to
17

Defendant's letters, Plaintiff is now estopped from enforcing the
Stipulation.

Mr. Rowe's letter of September 10, 1990 clearly

states that he advised Mrs. Rowe of his belief as follows:
alia,

inter

In January of 1990, he stopped sending $300.00 per child for

the children because the Judge had refused to sign the Order
submitted with the Stipulation.

He further stated, "You must be

aware-by now-that the only monies required of me, is the $700.00
ordered in the Texas Decree . . ." (R Pg. 191: Addendum #12).
It was not until May 4, 1992 that the Court obtained financial
statements from Defendant (R 3 65) which showed be had no income,
no assets and expenses of $540.00 per month. This should have been
the thrust of the Court's inquiry on March 17, 1992 at its Order
to Show Cause hearing, not the enforcement of the invalid and
statutorily unacceptable Stipulation.
VI.

Stipulation Does Not Represent a Meeting of the Minds

Between the Parties.

Based upon the Plaintiff's letter to the

Court (R Pg. 103: Addendum #3), the Plaintiff did not understand
the terms and conditions of the Stipulation, although she signed
it.

In her letter to the Court, the Plaintiff indicates that the

Defendant had agreed to pay all court costs and recording fees.
Mr. Rowe indicates that he did not agree to those arrangements; but
Plaintiff's letter indicates she thought he had; thus changing the
intent of the Stipulation to include Mr. Rowe paying attorney fees
18

and court costs (R Pg. 194, Paragraph 5: Addendum #12).

The

Stipulation itself does not mention recording fees but indicates
that

the

court

costs

and

attorneys1

fees

would

be

the

responsibility of each respective party (R Pg. 105, Paragraph 9:
Addendum #3).

The Defendant's Affidavit indicates his belief was

that each party would be responsible for their own attorney's fees
and he never at any time agreed to be responsible for and pay all
attorneys'

fees

and

costs

(R Pgs.

192-195: Addendum #12).

Therefore, the actions of the Plaintiff indicate that there was
never any full meeting of the minds even though she signed the
Stipulation.

In Mooney vs. G. P. & Associates. 746 P.2d 1174, at

page 1178, this Court stated,"It is well settled that a contract
is voidable if there is a mutual mistake of material fact."
Further, the Defendant, upon receipt of a copy of the Plaintiff's
letter to the Court, realized that there was no agreement between
the parties and therefore the Stipulation, even though signed, did
not really represent a meeting of the minds as between the parties,
and since the Court had indicated that it was not going to approve
the Stipulation and sign the Order, that the Stipulation was of no
force and effect (See Defendant's letter to Plaintiff R Pg. 191:
Addendum #12).

It is clear from the documents before the Court

that the Defendant believed that the Stipulation was not binding.
In his correspondence to the Plaintiff of September 10, 1990, he
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clearly states that he is only bound by the Texas Decree (R Pg.
191: Addendum #16).

Therefore, to grant Plaintiff's motion would

be to enforce a stipulation that was once correctly rejected by the
Court upon which the parties never really had a meeting of the
minds, in a case that has already been dismissed due to lack of
prosecution and noncompliance with statute.

In addition, since

both parties had brought actions to modify the Texas Decree, Mr.
Rowe, based upon his drastic and material change in circumstances,
and Mrs. Rowe based upon his failure to pay and her increased
expenses, the question of material change of circumstances was
plainly before the Court. The Court's proper direction should have
been the investigation of the changed circumstances, which it
failed to do.
VII.

Improper Execution.

Court committed one last error

Defendant submits that the Trial
in its determination of this case.

The Order on Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 296: Addendum #13) has not
been properly signed by the Court. The stamped reproduction of the
Commissioner's

signature

does

not validate

the

Order.

The

Defendant in this action knows of no rule or statute which would
allow the clerk to stamp the signature of the Commissioner on an
order to make it valid.
Judicial Code.

The closest rule we have found is in the

The applicable Rule is found at 4-403 of the Code

of Judicial Administration, which states in its pertinent parts:
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(1)

The clerk of the court may, upon prior judicial
approval, use a "Signature Stamp" in lieu of
obtaining the judge's signature on the following:
(d) Orders to Show Cause

(2)

When a clerk is authorized to use a signature
stamped as provided in paragraph (a) , the clerk
shall sign his or her name on the order or minute
entry directly beneath the stamped imprint of the
judge's name.

(3)

All other orders shall be personally signed by the
judge.

Even if the Order on Order to Show Cause meets this Rule, which
Defendant does not admit, it is clear that whoever stamped the
Order

should

not

have

done

so

compliance with the above Rule.

without

signing

the

same

in

A quick review of the Order on

Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 296: Addendum #13) shows that this was
not done.

By not complying with this rule, Defendant submits that

the Order on Order to Show Cause is invalid and should not be
upheld.
CONCLUSION
At the time when the parties submitted the Stipulation and
Order to the above entitled Court, neither one was living within
the State.

The Stipulation was negotiated between them, and their

respective counsel, and was submitted to the Court, together with
an Order, for the Commissioner's signature.

However, the Court

rejected the Order and the Stipulation and requested additional
information to comply with the Utah Statutes regulating
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Child

Support Guidelines. When the parties failed to come forth with the
requested documentation, the Court correctly on its own motion,
dismissed the case.

The dismissal of the case rendered the

Stipulation null and void.

In addition, the letter from the

Plaintiff indicating a different understanding of the Stipulation
from that expressed in the Stipulation, indicates that she did not
fully understand the Stipulation and that a meeting of the minds
had not occurred. In addition, the inaction of the Plaintiff after
notice and her acceptance of the Texas Decree child support amount
constitutes waiver and estoppel.

Further, the Court below erred

in not bringing the Stipulation within the requirements of the
Child Support Statutes and not directing its inquiry into the
material change of circumstances alleged by the parties. The Court
failed to comply with §§ 78-45-7, 78-45-7.3; Rule 4-504 and Rule
4-403.

Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the case

be remanded back to the Fourth Judicial District Court for further
proceedings and that the Order on Order to Show Cause be stricken
and the Stipulation of September 10, 1989 be declared null and
void.
DATED on this the dJo*~ <*aY of February, 1993.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Attorney for Defendant
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Ginger E. Rowe, Pro Se
5936 West 10550 North
Highland, Utah 84004
Ginger E. Rowe, Pro Se
226 North 100 West
American Fork, Utah 84003
Marilyn Moody Brown
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2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
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